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The expansion of regionalism has spawned an extensive theoretical literature analysing the 
effects of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) on trade flows. In this paper we focus on FTAs 
(also called European agreements) between the European Union (EU-15) and the Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEEC-4, i.e. Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania ) and 
model their effects on trade flows by treating the agreement variable as endogenous. Our 
theoretical framework is the gravity model, and the econometric method used to isolate and 
eliminate the potential endogeneity bias of the agreement variable is the fixed effect vector 
decomposition (FEVD) technique. Our estimation results indicate a positive and significant 
impact of FTAs on trade flows. This finding is robust to the inclusion in the sample of a group 
of control countries (specifically Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine) that did not 
sign an FTA. Besides, we show that trade growth after the FTA agreement with the EU was 
signed exceeded trade growth of the control group of countries which did not become 
members. 
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Following the new wave of regionalisation in the eighties, regional integration has again 
been extensively investigated both in the theoretical and empirical literature. Recent 
analyses are based on Viner’s (1950) framework but also include theoretical ideas from 
the new trade theory and economic geography, being concerned with the impact of 
integration on global welfare. The innovation compared to the first wave studies consists 
in taking into account the dynamic effects of geographical size, non-economic gains, 
industrial localisation, and economies of scale.  
 
The enlargement of the European Union (EU) to 27 countries which was proposed during 
the nineties was unprecedented in terms of the number of countries and the changes 
which were implied, hence representing a challenge for both EU member countries and 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). It was a very important development for 
the future of the European continent. From a political point of view, it ensured stability 
after the troubled years of the Cold War. From an economic point of view, because of the 
size and the population of the countries involved and the development gap relative to the 
EU, the transition towards a market economy has not been without difficulties for the 
CEEC.  
 
There exists already an extensive literature analysing the effects of regional free trade 
agreements (FTAs) on trade flows and stressing the role of regionalisation. However, the 
evidence is mixed. Most studies assume that the FTA formation (i.e. the choice of partner 
countries) is exogenous, but some papers highlight the potential endogeneity bias in 
estimating the effects of FTAs on trade volumes (Magee, 2003; Baier and Bergstrand, 
2004). Regional agreements require the assent of two governments. According to 
Grossman and Helpman (1995) a FTA assumes a relative balance in the potential trade 
between the partner countries.  
 
In this paper we focus on association agreements between four Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEEC-4, i.e. Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania) and   3
European Union member states (EU-15, i.e. Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg, Denmark, 
England, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden) in the context of EU enlargement towards the East, taking into account the 
conditions under which countries agree on FTAs, and their effects on trade. Our 
econometric analysis is based on the gravity model and tries to determine the effects of 
association agreements on trade flows treating FTAs as endogenous. We are particularly 
interested in whether such European agreements have increased trade flows between their 
members and, if so, by how much. To address these issues, we examine the bilateral trade 
volume introducing a dummy variable which represents the association agreement.  In 
addition, we investigate the robustness of the association agreement variable in two 
different ways by considering an extended sample of countries including three countries 
(Belarus, Russian Federation and Ukraine) that did not sign an FTA with EU-15 and using 
different estimations methods. Also, we compare the trade growth between the EU-15 and 
CEEC-4 countries and the trade growth between the EU-15 and other countries which did not 
have a trade agreement. Further, we use panel data techniques to isolate and eliminate the 
potential endogeneity bias of the agreement variable 
 
The contribution of this paper is threefold: i) in contrast to previous studies we rely on a 
estimation method, i.e. the fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD), that enables us to   
isolate and eliminate the potential endogeneity bias of the agreement variable, thereby obtaining 
more robust results.  The agreement variable is here treated as endogenous, unlike in earlier 
studies. ii) The sample period has been extended and includes additional observations, spanning 
the period 1987-2005. iii) We check the robustness of the effects of FTAs  by also considering a 
group of control countries (Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine) which did not conclude 
an agreement with EU; besides, we examine whether bilateral trade between the CEEC-4 and 
EU-15 is higher than between the EU-15 and this group of control countries. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss briefly 
European agreements and the issue of endogeneity in regional agreements. In Section 3 
we outline the theoretical framework, i.e. the gravity model. In sections 4 we discuss 
alternative econometric methods to estimate gravity models, whilst the empirical analysis   4
is presented in Section 5. Section 6 summarises the main findings and offers some 
concluding remarks.  
 
 
2. European Agreements and the Endogeneity Issue 
EU enlargement is not a new phenomenon, as the EU has already been enlarged several 
times since its creation: the year 1973 marked the accession of Denmark, the United 
Kingdom and Ireland; 1981, of Greece; 1986, of Spain and Portugal; 1995, of Austria, 
Sweden and Finland. However, EU enlargement towards the East is different both 
politically and economically, as it is the first time that countries belonging to the old 
communist bloc have applied for EU membership, and on this occasion integration has 
increased by as much as a third the EU population and territory (and to a lesser extent its 
wealth). 
 
The EU proposed two basic strategic objectives for enlargement. Firstly, the creation of a 
Europe which guarantees peace, stability, democracy and respect of the human rights of 
minorities. Secondly, the creation of an open and competitive market able to improve the 
standard of living in the CEEC, gradually achieving real convergence. As a first step, in 
the early nineties all candidate countries signed bilateral “European Agreements” or 
“Association Agreements” with the EU creating preferential trade relationships.
5 These 
included a time schedule for trade liberalisation between the signatories, with the EU 
agreeing to reduce barriers more quickly than the CEEC. However, initially tariff and 
non-tariff barriers were not dismantled for sensitive sectors such as agriculture and 
textiles. 
 
The expansion of regionalism has spawned an extensive literature on the effects of FTAs 
on trade flows and the choice of countries to form a preferential trade agreement. This 
literature focuses on welfare-enhancing and political arguments to explain association 
agreements. Since Viner (1950) most studies have analysed the welfare gains or losses 
                                                 
5 Hungary (1991), Poland (1991), Romania (1993), Czech Republic (1993), Slovakia (1993), Bulgaria 
(1993), Latvia (1995), Estonia (1995), Lithuania (1995), Slovenia (1995).   5
from FTAs for member countries. FTAs have a positive impact on welfare if trade 
creation exceeds trade diversion. Factors accounting for the probability that two countries 
sign a regional agreement can be divided in three groups: (i) geography factors, (ii) intra-
industry trade determinants, (iii) inter-industry trade determinants
6. In brief, two 
countries are more likely to sign an agreement if they are closer geographically, similar in 
size and differ in terms of factor endowment ratios: 
 
i) The net welfare gain is higher the closer the two countries are, because of trade 
creation. Several studies (see Frankel, Stein and Wei, 1996; Frankel and Wei, 1998) 
include geographical proximity in their analysis of a FTA formation. The rationale is the 
existence of transport costs (Helpman and Krugman, 1985), leading to the concept of 
"natural trade partners" based on geographical distance
7. Krugman (1991b) shows that in 
the case of agreements between geographically close countries trade creation is sizable 
(see also Wonnacott and Lutz, 1989), but the concept of “natural” partners has attracted 
criticism, on the grounds that geographical proximity and initially high trade volumes do 
not necessarily ensure trade creation after FTA formation (see Bhagwati and Panagaryia, 
1996). 
  (ii) The larger and more similar in economic size the two countries signing a trade 
agreement are, the higher the welfare gains from trade creation, which are achieved by 
exploiting economies of scale in the presence of differentiated products. 
(iii)  The greater the difference in endowment ratios between two countries, the higher 
the potential welfare gains from trade creation reflecting traditional comparative 
advantages.  
 
Consequently, countries which sign a regional agreement tend to have similar economic 
characteristics, which leads to trade creation and welfare gains. 
 
Non-economic objectives can also be behind regional agreements (Johnson 1965b, 
Cooper and Massell (1965), Wonnacott and Lutz, 1989, Magee, 2003, Baier and 
                                                 
6 See Baier and Bergstrand, (2004) 
7 These models emphasise the role of transport costs in maximising/minimising the welfare of countries 
(proximity of /distance between partners implies low/high transport costs).   6
Bergstrand, 2004). In particular, better political decision-making, a guarantee of policy 
irreversibility, and bigger negotiating power with third parties could also explain such 
agreements (especially when the agreement takes the form of a customs union with a 
common exterior tariff – see Schiff and Winters, 1998). Also, democratic countries are 
more interested in consumers’ welfare and more likely to sign agreements with other 
democratic partners. Further, De Melo et al. (1993) showed that regional agreements 
make the implementation of policies more effective owing to a dilution effect of 
preferences: the lobby capacity of interest groups is lower in a regional as opposed ot 
national framework. Finally, such agreements make domestic policy reforms irreversible 
(Fernandez et Portes, 1998). 
 
There exists already an extensive literature analysing the effects of regional free trade 
agreements (FTAs) on trade flows and stressing the role of regionalization. Rose (2004) 
in his paper estimates the effect of multilateral trade agreements: the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) on international 
trade. He uses a standard gravity model of bilateral trade and a large panel data set. His 
findings reveal that there is little evidence that GATT/WTO membership has a substantial 
positive effect on trade. The GSP and the regional trade associations typically seem to 
have a much larger effect than the multilateral GATT/WTO system indicating that trade 
at least doubles with membership.  
 
The first empirical studies analysing the trade effects of a FTA included a FTA dummy 
variable in a gravity model.  Most of them treated FTA formation (choice of partner 
countries) as exogenous. The evidence was mixed. For instance, some studies found a 
significant impact of EC (European Community) agreements on trade flows between 
members (Aitken, 1973), whilst others concluded that this effect was insignificant 
(Bergstrand, 1985) or even negative (Frankel, 1997). This highlighted the potential 
endogeneity bias affecting the preferential agreement variable, and subsequently a few 
studies tried to address the endogeneity issue by considering the role of economic factors, 
democratic freedom, and transport costs in the decision to conclude a regional agreement. 
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) found that pairs of countries that sign an agreement tend to   7
share common economic characteristics, which results in net trade creation and welfare 
growth. Magee (2003) measured the effects of preferential agreements on trade volumes 
treating FTAs as endogenous, estimating a system of simultaneous equations with 2SLS. 
He found that it is likely that two countries will sign an agreement if they are closer 
geographically, are similar in size and are both democracies. 
 
Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) tried to test the robustness of the regional agreement effect by 
using cross-section data. They concluded that its effect may be over- or underestimated 
owing to the potential endogeneity of this variable. These findings were confirmed by 
Baier and Bergstrand (2007), who pointed out that the regional agreement variable is not 
exogenous and the estimation of a gravity model using cross-section data for 
investigating the quantitative effect of this variable on trade flows can be biased because 
of unobservable heterogeneity or/and omitted variables. The bias resulting from not 
considering this variable as endogenous is an important issue; it can be the consequence 
of omitted variables that can be correlated with the regional agreement variable. Panel 
data (fixed effects) methods were shown to be suitable to take endogeneity into account.  
Given the theoretical and empirical literature presented above concerning the FTA 
formation, we now focus on the specific conditions which determined the association of 
the CEEC-4 with the EU-15. The European Union enlargement to include the CEEC 
countries was one of the Nice Summit challenges. This enlargement has contributed to 
overcoming the artificial division of Europe, and has finally given the CEEC countries, 
which have always been part of Europe, a chance to participate in the European project. 
 
The collapse of the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) put an end to 
trade on the basis of planned exchanges, and to major industrial projects and/or 
cooperation contracts based on production complementarity without considering demand 
and supply. It has led to major transformations with the introduction of a market 
economy, reintegration of the CEEC into the European economy, and changes in the 
geography of the European Union. On their part, the Western European countries have 
turned more towards the CEEC countries, a dynamic and accessible market. Both trade 
reorientation and EU enlargement have led to the signing of association agreements, the   8
first step towards integration. In fact, the ultimate goal of the agreements is the accession 
of these countries. Despite the similar framework and structure of the agreements, 
allowance has been made for differences across countries, especially in terms of free 
trade, financial cooperation and sectoral policies.  
 
In conclusion, in the context of the EU enlargement, the economic and political transition 
of the CEECs to a market economy and towards a democratic system and the 
geographical proximity to the EU-15 core represent important factors that determine the 
signing of association agreements. Even if the literature indicates the importance of 
economic size in the FTA formation, in this case we can see the existence of differences 
in factor endowment between the EU and the CEEC which can generate trade flows 
based on comparative advantage, and therefore increase the wealth. As international trade 
is one of the factors driving economic growth, we are interested in examining the effects 
on trade of FTAs between the CEEC-4 and the EU-15. 
 
 
3. Trade Flow Effects of FTAs: The Gravity Model 
Our theoretical framework to examine the trade flows effects of FTAs (treating 
association agreements as endogenous) is the gravity model 
8, in which trade flows from 
country i to country j are a function of the supply of the exporter country and of the 
demand of the importer country and trade barriers. In other words, national incomes of 
two countries, transport costs (transaction costs) and regional agreements are the basic 
determinants of trade.  
 
Initially inspired by Newton’s gravity law, gravity models have become essential tools in 
the analysis of the effects of regional agreements on trade flows. The first applications 
were rather intuitive, without great theoretical claims. These included the contributions of 
Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963). But these studies were criticised for their lack of 
robust theoretical foundations. Subsequently, new international trade theory provided 
                                                 
8 The popularity of the gravity model is highlighted by Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) who consider it “the 
workhorse for empirical studies of regional integration”. 
   9
theoretical justifications for these models in terms of increasing returns of scale, 
imperfect competition and geography (transport costs).  
 
Linnemann (1966) proposed a gravity model derived from a Walrasian, general 
equilibrium model. He explained exports of country i  to country j  in terms of the 
interaction of three factors: potential supply of exports of country i, potential demand of 
imports from the country j and a factor representing trade barriers. Potential export 
supply is a positive function of the exporting country’s income level and can also be 
interpreted as a proxy for product variety. Potential import demand is a positive function 
of the importing country’s income level. Barriers to trade are a negative function of trade 
costs, transport costs, tariffs. The model takes the following form: 
∑
=
− − − k
kij
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ij j j i i ij e D N Y N Y e X
γ
β β β β β β 5 4 3 2 1 0    (1) 
where Y represents country income, N represents the population, D is the geographical 
distance and Pk includes dummy variables. Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985) and 
Helpman and Krugman (1985) provided further theoretical justifications for this model. 
 
This equation was extended by Bergstrand (1989) by including per capita income, which 
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where Xij represents exports of country i to country j, β0 is the intercept, Yi and Yj are the 
GDP of country i and j respectively, (Yi /Ni) and (Yj /Nj ) stand for GDP per capita of 
country  i and j respectively, Dij represents the geographical distance between the 
economic centers of two partners, Pkij stands for other variables such as common 
language and historical bonds. 
 
4. Econometric Issues    10
The regionalism issue was most frequently examined using a gravity model including a 
dummy variable for regional agreements
9. Most studies estimating a gravity model 
applied the ordinary least square (OLS) method to cross-section data. Recently several 
papers have argued that standard cross-section methods lead to biased results because 
they do not account for heterogeneity. For instance, the impact of historical, cultural and 
linguistic links on trade flows is difficult to quantify. On the other hand, the potential 
sources of endogeneity bias in gravity model estimations fall under three categories: 
omitted variables, simultaneity, and measurement error (see Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
Matyas (1997) points out that the cross-section approach is affected by misspecification 
and suggests that the gravity model should be specified as a “three – way model” with 
exporter, importer and time effects (random or fixed ones). Egger (2000) argues that 
panel data methods are the most appropriate for disentangling time-invariant and country- 
specific effects. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) underline that the omission of specific 
effects for country pairs can bias the estimated coefficients. An alternative solution is to 
use an estimator to control bilateral specific effects as in a fixed effect model (FEM) or in 
a random effect model (REM). The advantage of the former is that it allows for 
unobserved or misspecified factors that simultaneously explain the trade volume between 
two countries and lead to unbiased and efficient results
10. The choice of the method 
(FEM or REM) is determined by economic and econometric considerations. From an 
economic point of view, there are unobservable time-invariant random variables, difficult 
to be quantified, which may simultaneously influence some explanatory variables and 
trade volume. From  an econometric point of view, the inclusion of fixed effects is 
preferable to random effects because the rejection of the null assumption of no 
correlation between the unobservable characteristics and explanatory variables is less 
plausible (see Baier and Bergstrand 2007).  
 
                                                 
9 Baldwin (1994), Frankel (1997), Soloaga and Winters (2001), Glick and Rose (2002), Rault and al. 
(2007), Carrere (2006) 
10 Egger (2000), Egger (2002) 
   11
Another method which has gained considerable acceptance among economists (see Egger 
and Pfaffermayr, 2004) is the Hausman-Taylor's panel one incorporating time-invariant 
variables correlated with bilateral specific effects (see, for instance, Hausman-Taylor, 
1981; Wooldridge, 2002; Hsiao, 2003). Plümper and Troeger (2004) have proposed a 
more efficient method called “the fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD)” to 
accommodate time-invariant variables. Using Monte Carlo simulations they compared 
the performance of the FEVD method to some other existing techniques, such as the 
fixed effects, or random effects, or Hausman-Taylor method. Their results indicate that 
the most reliable technique for small samples is FEVD if time-invariant variables and the 
other variables are correlated with specific effects, which is likely to be the case in our 
study. Consequently, we use this technique for the empirical analysis. 
 
Next we provide more details of the alternative methods mentioned above, i.e. random 




4.1  Within Estimator and Random Estimator (FEM and REM)                
In the presence of correlation of the unobserved characteristics with some of the 
explanatory variables the random effect estimator leads to biased and inconsistent 
estimates of the parameters. To eliminate this correlation it is possible to use a traditional 
method called “within estimator or fixed effect estimator” which consists in transforming 
the data into deviations from individual means.  In this case, even if there is correlation 
between unobserved characteristics and some explanatory variables, the within estimator 
provides unbiased and consistent results. 
 








, t = 1, 2,…,T,    k=1, 2,,K regressors, i=1, 2,,N individuals      (2) 
where αi denotes individual effects fixed over time and uit is the disturbance term.   12
If we substract from (2) the average over time of (2) we obtain the fixed effects 
transformation as: 
 
) ( ) (
1
i it ik itk
K
k
k i it u u x x y y − + − = − ∑
=
β         (3) 
 
In the fixed effect transformation, the unobserved effect, αi, disappears, which yields 
unbiased and consistent results.  
 
The random model has the same form as before, 
  
Yit = â0 + â1xit1 + â2xit2 …………….. +âkxitk + ái + uit          (4) 
 
where an intercept is included so that the unobserved effect, ái, has a zero mean. Equation 
(4) becomes a random effect model when we assume that the unobserved effect ái is 
uncorrelated with each explanatory variable: 
 
Cov(xitk, ái) = 0, t = 1,2,…, T;  j =1,2,…, k.       (5) 
 
The Hausman χ
2 test consists in testing the null hypothesis of no correlation between 
unobserved characteristics and some explanatory variables and allows us to make a 
choice between random estimator and within estimator. The within estimator has however 
two important limits:  
- it may not estimate the time-invariant variables that are eliminated by data 
transformation;  
- the fixed effect estimator ignores variations across individuals. The individual’s 
specificities can be correlated or not with the explanatory variable. In traditional methods 
these correlated variables are replaced with instrumental variables uncorrelated to 
unobservable characteristics.  
 
4.2.  Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition (FEVD)   13
Plümper and Troeger (2004) suggest an alternative to the estimation of time-invariant 
variables in the presence of unit effects, namely the model discussed in Hsiao (2003). It is 
known that unit fixed effects are a vector of the mean effect of omitted variables, 
including the effect of time-invariant variables. It is therefore possible to regress the unit 
effects on the time-invariant variables to obtain approximate estimates for invariant 
variables. Plümper and Troeger (2004) propose a three-stage estimator, where the second 
stage only aims at the identification of the unobserved parts of the unit effects, and then 
uses the unexplained part to obtain unbiased pooled OLS (POLS) estimates of the time-
varying and time-invariant variables only in the third stage. The unit effect vector is 
decomposed into two parts: a part explained by time-invariant variables and an 
unexplainable part (the error term). The model proposed by Plümper and Troeger (2004) 
yields unbiased and consistent estimates of the effect of time-varying variable and 
unbiased for time-invariant variables if the unexplained part of unit effects is uncorrelated 
with time-invariant variables.  
 
  This model has the robustness of fixed effect model and allows for the correlation 
between the time-variant explanatory variables and the unobserved individual effects. In 
brief, the fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD) proposed by Plümper and Troeger 
(2004) involves the three following steps:  
¾  estimation of the unit fixed effects by the FEM excluding the time-invariant 
explanatory variables;  
¾  regression of the fixed effect vector on the time-invariant variables of the original 
model (by OLS);  
¾ re-estimation of the original model by POLS, including all time-variant 
explanatory variables, time-invariant variables and the unexplained part of the fixed 




A general form of regression equation can be written as : 
                                                 
11  The program STATA proposed by the authors executes all three steps and adjusts the variance-
covariance matrix. Options like AR (1) error-correction and robust variance-covariance matrix are allowed.   14
 
it i it it Z X y ε γ β α + + + =  (8) 
 where : 
             βXit = time-variant variable vector; 
             γZi    = time-invariant variable vector; 
   εit   = normal distributed error component; 
 
In the presence of unobserved time-invariant variables the equation (8) can be written as 
 
it i i it it u Z X y ε γ β α + + + + =   (9) 
 
where ui  = unobserved time-invariant variable whose unobserved effects are a random 
variable rather than an estimated parameter. 
 




Recall the data generating process of equation (8). The within estimator quasi de-means 
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The variance not used by the fixed effect estimator is most important.  
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where :   15
 ηi is the unexplained part of the unit effects and  i ε  are the average unit means of the 
FEM estimation (indicating panel heteroskedasticity if  i ε  ≠ 0) 
 
Second step 
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where ω is the intercept of the stage 2 equation and ηi is the unexplained part of the unit 
effects as in equation (11). Equations (11) and (12) show that the exclusion of variables 
that are simultaneously correlated with the unit-effects  i u ˆ  and the time-invariant 
variables zi lead to biased estimates. In other words, the estimates are unbiased only if ηi 
≅ 0 for all i or if E( zi | ηi )=E(zi) = 0. 
 
Third step 
The full model is rerun without the unit effects but including the decomposed unit fixed 
effect vectors comprising   i η ˆ  obtained in step 2. The third step is estimated by pooled 












By construction,  i η ˆ  is no longer correlated with the vector of the z’s. 
 
By including the error term of step 2 it is possible to account for individual specific 
effects that cannot be observed. The coefficient of  i η ˆ  is either equal to 1.0 or at least 
close to 1.0 (by accounting for serial correlation or panel heteroskedasticity) in step 3. 
Estimating stage 3 by pooled OLS further requires that heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation must be eliminated beforehand.  
 
At least in theory this method has three obvious advantages (see Plümper and Troeger, 
2004):   16
a) the fixed effect vector decomposition does not require prior knowledge of the 
correlation between time-variant explanatory variables and unit specific effects,  
b) the estimator relies on the robustness of the within-transformation and does not need to 
meet the orthogonality assumptions (for time-variant variables) of random effects,  
c) FEVD estimator maintains the efficiency of POLS. 
 
Essentially FEVD produces unbiased estimates of time-varying variables, regardless of 
whether they are correlated with unit effects or not, and unbiased estimates of time-
invariant variables that are not correlated. The estimated coefficients of the time-
invariable variables correlated with unit effects, however, suffer from omitted variable 
bias. To summarise, FEVD produces less biased and more efficient coefficients. The 
main advantages of FEVD come from its lack of bias in estimating the coefficients of 
time-variant variables that are correlated with unit-effects.  
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1 The Econometric Strategy 
The econometric model we adopt in order to identify and to quantify the impact of the 
association agreement on trade flows between the EU-15 and CEEC-4 countries was 
chosen taking into account our sample of data, the potential endogeneity of the variables, 
the existence of unobservable bilateral characteristics which might or might not be 
correlated with the explanatory variables, and multicollinearity. 
 
Our econometric specification is the following: 
) ,...... 1 ; ,...... 1 (
) log( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) log(
8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0
T t N i u Acc Llk Stp
Dist GDPC GDPC GDP GDP Y
ijt t ij ijt ij it
ij jt it jt it ijt
= = + + + + +
+ + + + + + =
ε θ α α α
α α α α α α
    (14) 
In this specification, the average value of bilateral trade (Yijt) is the dependent variable. 
The explanatory variables used are the gross domestic product of the two partners 
(GDPit), (GDPjt), geographic distance (Distij), income per capita (GDPCit,  GDPCjt), 
political stability (Stp), landlocked countries (Llk) and the dichotomous variable 
association agreement (Accijt).   17
 
The notation is the following: 
•  Yijt denotes the average value of bilateral trade between countries i and j at time t 
with i ≠ j (millions of dollars); 
•  αo is the intercept; 
•  GDPit, GDPjt represent the Gross Domestic Product of country i and country j  
(millions of dollars); 
•   GDPit /Nit, GDPjt  /Njt  are  the GDP per capita of country i and country j   
•  Distij represents the distance  between country i and country j  (kilometers);                    
•  Accijt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if country i  and country j have 
concluded a regional agreement at time t, and zero otherwise; 
•  Stpijt is a dummy variable  which is equal to 1 if country has political stability and 
zero otherwise; 
•  Llkij is a dummy variable representing the number of landlocked countries in the 
country –pair (0, 1 or 2). 
•  uij is a bilateral specific effect (i = 1,2,…,N, j = 1,2,…,M) ; 
•  θt is a time specific effect (t = 1,…..T); 
•  εijt is the disturbance term, which is assumed to be normally distributed with a 
zero mean and a constant variance for all observations and to be uncorrelated. 
To assess the robustness of our results on the effects of FTAs we include in our sample a 
control group of countries, specifically Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, i.e. three 
countries, which belonged in the past to the Communist bloc and have then introduced 
market reforms but did not sign a FTA with the EU. More precisely, we test whether the 
association dummy is still significant if one considers the period where all CEEC-4 have 
an Accijt dummy of 1 and where additional countries that did not sign an FTA are added 
to the estimation sample with an Accijt dummy of 0. The Accijt dummy variable measures 
the impact of the association agreement on trade between members. The estimated 
equation is the same as (14) with the Accijt dummy now defined as explained above.   18
Another possible way of checking robustness is to make a comparison between growth in 
trade between the EU and the countries that signed a FTA (i.e., the CEEC-4) and some 
others that did not (here Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine).  For this purpose, 
we introduce in equation (14) two dummy variables
12. In this case, the equation to be 
estimated writes as follows:  
) ,...... 1 ; ,...... 1 (
) log( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) log(
8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0
T t N i u Accn Acc Llk Stp
Dist GDPC GDPC GDP GDP Y
ijt t ij ijt ijt ij it
ij jt it jt it ijt
= = + + + + + +
+ + + + + + =
ε θ α α α
α α α α α α
   (15) 
where: 
•  Accijt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if country i  and country j have 
concluded a regional agreement at time t, and zero otherwise; 
•  Accnijt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if one country has a regional 
agreement and its partner-country does not at time t, and zero otherwise; 
The first dummy variable measures the impact of the agreement on trade between FTA’ 
members and the second one measures the trade effect between a member country and 
another which is not. 
The data source is the CHELEM – French CEPII data base for GDP and population; the 
CEPII data base for geographic distance and Freedom House for political stability. The 
estimation period goes from 1987 to 2005, i.e. 19 years for a sample of EU-15
13 and 4 
CEEC countries
14 for the first set of estimates. For the second we have a sample from 
1991 to 2005 owing to fewer observations being available for the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine. We construct a panel with two dimensions: country pairs, and years.  
 
5.2 Estimation Results 
                                                 
12 Rose (2004) also compares trade patterns for countries in the GATT/WTO with those outside the system 
using two dummy variables, one to measure the trade effect if both countries are GATT/WTO and the other 
if one country is a member and the other is not. 
13 EU-15: Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg, Denmark, England, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, 
Ireland, Italy,  Portugal, Spain, Sweden. 
14 Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania.   19
This section summarises the results from the estimation of the gravity model. We used 
panel data techniques for eliminating the endogeneity bias, and applied different panel 
data econometric methods such as Fixed Effect Model (FEM), Random Effect Model 
(REM) and Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition (FEVD) in order to check the robustness 
of our estimation technique and also of our results (see Table 1, 2). 
 
Table 1 shows the impact of FTAs on bilateral trade between EU15 and CEEC4. The 
aggregate estimation indicates a positive effect of the association agreement variable on 
trade flows, in accordance with previous studies
15. This is a standard result consistent 
with the theory of regional integration: membership of the FTA facilitates trade 
exchanges between the partners. The coefficients are statistically significant and have the 
expected signs consistent with the gravity model: a positive effect on trade flows of 
country size, income per capita, political stability and association agreement, and a 
negative impact of geographical distance.  The effect of the association agreement is 
positive and the estimated coefficient is 0.204 (see column 3, Table 1), which indicates 
that the agreement results in a 23% increase 
16 in trade between the members. Thus, there 
is clear evidence that the agreement has increased trade volume between the EU-15 and 
CEEC-4 countries.  
 
We assessed the robustness of our results using data for a larger group of countries (also 
including Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine) (see column 3, Table 2). Since 
the FEVD method produces more robust estimates in what follows we focus on the 
FEDV estimates. All variables are still significant and have the expected sign, including 
the FTA variable.  We note that in all cases the FTA variable has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on bilateral trade. This result is robust to the use of different 
estimation techniques or different samples of countries. 
We also made a comparison between trade between the EU and the countries that signed 
a FTA (i.e., the CEEC-4) and some others that did not, and estimated for this purpose 
equation (15) that includes two dummy variables. Our econometric results (see Table 3) 
                                                 
15 See for instance, Soloaga and Winters (2001), Carrère (2006), Rault, Sova and Sova (2007). 
16 (≈ exp (0.204)-1   20
indicate that both dummies are significant at the 1% level, which suggests that members 
countries are more inclined to trade amongst themselves than with other countries which 
are not part of the association agreement. Moreover, the estimated coefficients of the 
Accijt and Accnijt dummy variables are respectively 0.210 and 0.089, which highlights 
that countries which have signed an association agreement trade 14.0 %
17 more than 
those without such an agreement. (see Table 3). 
As for robustness to using alternative estimation techniques, one can see that the 
estimated coefficients are similar for FEM and FEVD; however, the latter not only 
enables us to isolate the endogeneity of the association agreement variable and to obtain 
unbiased coefficients, but also captures the effects of time-invariant variables on trade 
flows. 
 
The Fisher test suggests the introduction of effects (fixed or random) to improve the 
estimation results. The estimated coefficients of the FEM are different from those 
obtained with the REM (for instance, association agreement) which can be explained by 
the existence of a correlation between some explanatory variables and the bilateral 
specific effect. Moreover, the Hausman test rejects the null assumption of no correlation 
between the individual effects and some explanatory variables for all estimations. This 
implies endogeneity bias, and therefore the fixed effects model is preferred. The 
Davidson-MacKinnon test of exogeneity (F=160.26, P-value = 0.00), confirm the 
endogeneity of the FTA. We also calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF) to ensure 
that multicollinearity does not affect the quality of estimates. In our all estimates, VIF did 
not exceed the threshold of 10, indicating that there is no multicollinearity
18.  
Overall, the agreement variable coefficient indicates a positive and statistically 
significant impact on bilateral trade in all cases. 
.6. Conclusions 
                                                 
17  ≈ (exp (0.21)-1)- (exp(0.09)-1) 
18  A variance inflation factor value higher than 10 reveals the presence of multicollinearity requiring 
specific corrections (see Gujarati, 1995).    21
This paper has analysed the impact of association agreements on trade flows between the 
EU-15 and CEEC-4 countries treating the agreement variable as endogenous and using 
appropriate panel methods to estimate a gravity equation. The most relevant estimates are 
those provided by the FEVD estimation method which is the most appropriate for our 
purposes. This method permits to obtain unbiased coefficients and to capture the effects 
of time-invariant variables. As theory suggests, association agreements were found to 
have a positive and significant impact on trade flows between the participant countries.  
 
To check the robustness of the effects on trade of FTAs we have  also included in our 
sample a control group of countries (Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine), i.e. three 
countries, which belonged in the past to the Communist bloc and have then introduced 
market reforms but did not sign a FTA with the EU. It must be emphasised that in all our 
estimations (conditional to other variables) the FTA variable has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on bilateral trade regardless of the estimation technique or  
sample of countries chosen, which provide evidence of the robustness of our results. 
A comparison of trade between the EU-15 and the countries that signed a FTA (i.e., the 
CEEC-4) and some others that did not, specifically Belarus, Russian Federation and Ukraine, 
using two dummy variables, suggest that countries with an association agreement trade 
14.0% more than the others, which do not have one. This result is consistent with theory 
and the experience of these countries. Indeed, in the case of the CEEC-4, following the 
FTA, within a few years the EU became their main commercial partner. The relative 
weight of CEEC-4 trade with the EU-15 was approximately 37 % in 1990; 60 % in 2000 
and 74% in 2005, whereas for Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine it was around 




   22
References 
[1] Aitken, N. D. (1973). The effect of the EEC and EFTA on European trade: a 
Temporal Cross-Section Analysis.  American Economic Review  63 (5): 881-892. 
[2] Anderson, J. E. (1979). A Theoretical Foundation for the Gravity Equation.  American 
Economic Review 69 (1): 106-116.  
[3] Baier, S.L., and J.H. Bergstrand (2004). Economic Determinants of Free-Trade 
Agreements.  Journal of International Economics 64(1): 29-63. 
[4] Baier, S.L., and J. H. Bergstrand (2007). Do Free Trade Agreements Actually 
Increase Members' International Trade?.  Journal of International Economics, Elsevier 
71(1): 72-95. 
[5] Baldwin, R. E. (1994). Towards an Integrated Europe, London, CEPR. 
[6] Bergstrand, J. H. (1985). The Gravity Equation in International Trade: Some 
Microeconomic Foundations and Empirical Evidence. Review of Economics and 
Statistics. 67(3): 474-481. 
[7] Bergstrand, J. H. (1989). The Generalized Gravity Equation, Monopolistic 
Competition, and the Factor-Proportions  Theory in International Trade. Review of 
Economics and Statistics 71(1): 143-153. 
[8] Bhagwati, J. ,and A. Panagariya (1996). The Theory of Preferential Trade 
Agreements: Historical Evolution and Current Trends “, American Economic Review 
86(2): 82-87. 
 [9] Carrere, C. (2006). Revisiting the Effects of Regional Trading Agreements on Trade 
Flows with Proper Specification of the Gravity Model. European Economic Review 50 
(2):223-247. 
[10] Cooper, C. A., and B. F. Massell (1965). A New Look at Customs Union Theory. 
Economic Journal  75 (300):742-747.  
[11] De Melo, J., and al. (1993). The New Regionalism: a Country Perspective. Policy 
Research Working Paper Series 1094, The World Bank.  
[12] Egger, P. (2000). A note on the Proper Econometric Specification of the Gravity 
Equation. Economics Letters 66 (1):25-31. 
[13] Egger, P. (2002). An Econometric View on the Estimation of Gravity Models and 
the Calculation of Trade Potentials. The World Economy 25 (2): 297 – 312.   23
[14] Egger, P., and M. Pfaffermayr (2003). The proper panel econometric specification of 
the gravity equation: a three-way model with bilateral interaction effects. Empirical 
Economics 28 (3): 571-580. 
[15] Egger, P., and M. Pfaffermayr (2004). Distance, trade and FDI: a SUR Hausman-
Taylor approach. Journal of Applied Econometrics 19(2): 227-46. 
[16] Eichengreen, B., and D. A. Irwin (1995). Trade blocs, currency blocs and the 
reorientation of world trade in the 1930s.  Journal of International Economics, Elsevier.  
38(1-2): 1-24. 
[17] Fernández, R., and J. Portes (1998). Returns to Regionalism: An Analysis of Non 
traditional Gains from Regional Trade Agreements. World Bank Economic Review 12(2): 
197-220.  
  [18] Frankel, J. A., E. Stein, and S-J. Wei (1996). Regional Trading Arrangements: 
Natural or Supernatural.  American Economic Review  86 (2):52-56 
  [19] Frankel, J. A (1997). Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System. 
Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC.  
.[20] Frankel, J.A., and S-J. Wei. (1998). Open Regionalism in a World of Continental 
Trade Blocs. IMF Staff Papers. 45(3) :440-453. 
[21] Ghosh S. and S. Yamarik (2004). Are Regional Trading Arrangements Trade 
Creating?: An Aplication of Extreme Bounds Analysis.  Journal of International 
Economics 63 (2): 369-395. 
[22] Glick, R., and A. K. Rose (2002). Does a currency union affect trade ? The time 
series evidence. European Economic Review 46(6): 1125-1151. 
[23] Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1995). The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements. 
American Economic Review 85(4): 667-690.  
[24 ] Gujarati, D. N. (1995). Basic Econometrics.  McGraw-Hill College, Edition 3. 
[25] Hausman, J.A. and W.E Taylor (1981). Panel Data and Unobservable Individual 
Effects. Econometrica 49 (6):1377-1398. 
[26] Helpman, E., and P. Krugman (1985). Market Structure and Foreign Trade: 
Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition, and the International Economy. MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA.  
[27] Hsiao, C. (2003). Analysis of Panel Data. 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press.   24
[28] Johnson, H. (1965). An Economic Theory of Protectionism, Tariff Bargaining and 
the Formation of Customs Union.  Journal of Political Economy 73(3): 256-83. 
[29] Krugman, P. (1991). Geography and Trade, Cambridge (Mass.), MIT Press.  
[30] Linnemann, H. (1966). An Econometric Study of International Trade Flows, North 
Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam.  
[31] Magee, C. (2003). Endogenous Preferential Trade Agreements: An Empirical 
Analysis. Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy 2 (1), article 15. Berkeley 
Electronic Press.  
[32] Matyas, L. (1997). Proper Econometric Specification of the Gravity Model. The 
World Economy 20 (3): 363-368,  
[33] Plumper, T. and Troeger, V.E. (2004). “The estimation of time-invariant variables in 
panel analyses with unit fixed effects”. Social Science Research Network, Working 
Paper. 
 [34] Pöyhönen, P. (1963). A tentative model for the flows of trade between countries”, 
Weltwirtschftliches Archiv 90: 93-100. 
 [35] Rose, A K. (2004). Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?.  American 
Economic Review, 94(1): 98-114. 
[36] Rault C., R. Sova, and A. Sova (2007). The Role of Association Agreements Within 
European Union Enlargement to Central and Eastern European Countries. IZA Discussion 
Paper No. 2769. 
[37] Rault, C., A. Sova, and R. Sova (2007). The Endogeneity of Association Agreements 
and their Impact on Trade for Eastern Countries: Empirical Evidence for Romania. 
William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 868. 
[38] Rault C., R. Sova, and A. Sova (2008). Modelling international trade flows between 
CEEC and OECD countries. Applied Economics Letters (1-8) - forthcoming. 
[39] Schiff, M. and L. A.Winters (1998). Regional Integration as Diplomacy. World Bank 
Economic Review 12 (2): 271-295.  
 [40] Soloaga, I., and  L. A. Winters (2001). Regionalism in the Nineties: What Effect on 
trade? North American Journal of Economics and Finance 12 (1): 1-29. 
[41] Tinbergen J. (1962). Shaping the World Economy: Suggestions for an International 
Economic Policy.  Twentieth Century Fund, New York,.   25
 
[41] Viner, J. (1950). The Customs Union Issue, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, New York. 
[42] Wonnacott, P., and M. Lutz. (1989). Is There a Case for Free Trade Areas?. in 
Schott, J. ed., Free Trade Areas and US Trade Policy, Institute for International 
Economics: Washington, D.C. 
[43] Wooldridge, J.M (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data.2rd 
Edition” The MIT Press Cambridge. 
 
 
   26
  
Table 1 – The impact of the association agreement on bilateral trade between EU-15    
                  and CEEC-4  
FEM  REM  FEVD 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
 
Variables 
Yijt  Yijt  Yijt 
1.453 0.701 1.453  GDPit 
(3.45)*** (5.52)*** (3.44)*** 
1.107 0.977 1.107  GDPjt 
(2.97)*** (13.32)*** (2.97)*** 
0.000 -1.447 -1.139  Distij 
(.) (8.07)***  (2.57)** 
0.660 1.424 0.660  GDPCit 
(1.89)* (8.03)***  (2.64)** 
0.816 0.881 0.816  GDPCjt 
(2.03)** (5.68)***  (56.25)*** 
0.000 -0.191 -0.031  Llkij 
(.) (2.30)**  (1.83)* 
0.160 0.159 0.160  Stpit 
(11.07)*** (11.79)***  (6.06)*** 
0.204 0.201 0.204  Accijt 
(12.10)*** (12.29)*** (18.57)*** 
-17.626 -12.101 -13.993  Constant 
(19.99)*** (15.56)***  (182.82)*** 
Observations  1064 1064 1064 
R-squared  0.82 0.87 0.96 
38.37 -  -  Fischer 
Prob>F  (0.00)    
- 13.08 -  Hausman 
Prob>chi2   (0.04)  
     
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 N.B. As explained in the main text, the FEVD method is the preferred one, the others (FEM and REM) are 
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Table 2 – The impact of the association agreement on bilateral trade using an 
extended sample of countries, i.e. the CEEC-4 and  additional countries 
which did not sign a FTA (Belarus, Russian Federation and Ukraine) 
FEM  REM  FEVD 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
 
Variables 
x  x  x 
0.797 0.951 0.797  GDPit 
(3.44)*** (17.56)*** (7.25)*** 
5.248 0.944 5.248  GDPjt 
(3.59)*** (13.68)*** (4.67)*** 
0.000 -1.170 -1.104  Distij 
(.) (7.15)***  (6.48)*** 
0.693 0.879 0.693  GDPCit 
(2.49)** (12.34)*** (2.56)** 
1.051 2.929 1.051  GDPCjt 
(2.03)** (13.78)*** (2.13)** 
0.000 -0.085 -0.114  Llkij 
(.) (1.72)*  (3.03)*** 
0.106 0.004 0.106  Stpit 
(3.11)*** (1.71)*  (2.01)** 
0.164 0.297 0.164  Accijt 
(4.29)*** (7.74)*** (5.01)*** 
-23.414 -13.694 -19.707  Constant 
(15.44)*** (13.20)***  (124.16)*** 
Observations  1470 1470 1470 
R-squared  0.82 0.64 0.85 
13.80 -  -  Fischer 
Prob>F  (0.04)    
- 230.23 -  Hausman 
Prob>chi2   (0.00)  
     
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
N.B. As explained in the main text, the FEVD method is the preferred one, the others (FEM and REM) are 
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Table 3 – The impact of the association agreement on bilateral trade using an 
extended sample of countries including the CEEC-4 and additional countries which 







1.118  GDPit 
(24.82)*** 
6.937  GDPjt 
(11.64)*** 
-4.270  Distij 
(62.67)*** 
1.209  GDPCit 
(1.74)* 
3.421  GDPCjt 
(74.12)*** 
-0.189  Llkij 
(4.55)*** 
0.057  Stpit 
(2.12)** 
0.210  Accijt 
(12.77)*** 
0.089  Accnijt 
(3.54)*** 
-8.770  Constant 
(108.29)*** 
Observations  1995 
R-squared  0.84 
   
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
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